My Life and Times

November 28, 2004WORD FOR WORD
Waging Small Wars, Then and NowBy THOMAS VINCIGUERRA
HE generals, the old chestnut goes, are always fighting the last war. But that doesn't mean they can't improvise, adapt and overcome. Witness the Army's newly published manual for waging the kind of asymmetrical conflict now being fought in Iraq. Formally known as F.M.I. 3-07.22, and titled "Counterinsurgency Operations," it was distributed to all branches of the military in October.
It's about time: Up until last month, many officers serving in Iraq had been relying on "The Small Wars Manual," a Marine Corps publication dating from 1940. Excerpts from the new Army guide and the old Marine manual show how much guerrilla warfare has changed in the last 64 years - while remaining strangely the same.
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Tread softly, advises "Counterinsurgency Operations":
Over all, don't hurt people unnecessarily. Some people simply don't understand what you are directing them to do.
But carry a big stick, says "The Small Wars Manual":
Delay in the use of force, and hesitation to accept responsibility for its employment when the situation clearly demands it, will always be interpreted as a weakness. Such indecision will encourage further disorder, and will eventually necessitate measures more severe than those which would have sufficed in the first instance.
"The Small Wars Manual" presumes that women and children are likely to be noncombatants:
For example, the patrol leader makes contact with a known camp and at the last moment finds that women camp followers are present in the camp. Shall he fire into the group?
But "Counterinsurgency Operations" warns against any such assumption:
[D]on't trust anyone! Young women have been very effective suicide bombers. Children have unknowingly and knowingly carried bombs into and through checkpoints.
"The Small Wars Manual" notes that it can be difficult to gather reliable intelligence from the locals, however friendly they may be:
In listening to peasants relate a story, whether under oath or not, or give a bit of information, it may appear that they are tricky liars trying to deceive or hide the truth, because they do not tell a coherent story. It should be understood that these illiterate and uneducated people live close to nature. The fact that they are simple and highly imaginative and that their background is based on some mystic form of religion gives rise to unusual kinds of testimony.
"Counterinsurgency Operations" recommends relying on observable facts instead:
Perform a daily comparison of the supplies purchase and movements information against the census card file information. Answer questions such as: Why is someone buying a 50-lb. bag of rice and 8 pairs of boots and 10 pairs of pants or rolls of cotton cloth when they have only a wife and four children to feed and clothe?
It helps, says "The Small Wars Manual," if you can talk the talk:
Political methods and motives which govern the actions of foreign people and their political parties, incomprehensible at best to the average North American, are practically beyond the understanding of persons who do not speak their language. If not already familiar with the language, all officers upon assignment to expeditionary duty should study and acquire a working knowledge of it.
In an era when troops are deployed with much shorter notice, "Counterinsurgency Operations" devotes an appendix to the use of interpreters:
Soldiers should not use profanity at all, and should avoid slang and colloquialisms. In many cases, such expressions cannot be translated. Even those that can be translated do not always retain the desired meeting. Military jargon and terms such as "gee whiz" or "golly" are hard to translate.
Written when pack animals were still in common use for transportation, "The Small Wars Manual" has much to say on the subject - for example, why mules are better than horses:
The mule withstands hot weather better, and is less susceptible to colic and founder than the horse ... A mule takes better care of himself, in the hands of an incompetent driver ...The foot of the mule is less subject to disorders ... Age and infirmity count less against a mule than a horse.
Animals are absent from "Counterinsurgency Operations," with one notable exception:
Military working dogs are a largely untapped resource. Dogs are trained in many skills, some of which can make a difference between success and failure of many combat missions. Dogs are trained for patrolling, searching buildings, scouting, or explosive detection. ... [But] dogs cannot be used as a security measure against detainees.
"The Small Wars Manual" recognizes that local populations may hesitate to cooperate:
While the peasant hopes for the restoration of peace and order, the constant menace and fear of guerrillas is so overpowering that he does not dare to place any confidence in an occasional visiting patrol of the occupying forces. When the patrol leader demands information, the peasant should not be misjudged for failure to comply with the request, when by so doing, he is signing his own death warrant.
The solution "Counterinsurgency Operations" offers is positive reinforcement:
Reward repentant insurgent sympathizers. Build the infrastructure of cooperative areas and publicize those accomplishments to the less-than-supportive groups. Seeing neighbors being compensated for their help will positively influence others to join in and secure them and their family from insurgent retribution.
In discussing exit strategies, "The Small Wars Manual" explains that the American military is not in the conquest business:
In accordance with national policy, it is to be expected that small war operations will not be conducted with a view to the permanent acquisition of any foreign territory. A force engaged in small wars operations may expect to be withdrawn from foreign territory as soon as its mission is accomplished.
"Counterinsurgency Operations" looks to the harm that open-ended involvement can do.
A long-term U.S. combat role may undermine the legitimacy of the HN [host nation] government and risks turning the conflict into a U.S.-only war. That combat role can also further alienate cultures that are hostile to the U.S.
Thomas Vinciguerra is an editor at The Week magazine.
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